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ROBERT E. LOONEY 
If economic adjustment to lower oil revenues and the uncertainties 
created by the Iran Iraq war were the main constraints to Kuwait's growth 
in the 1980s, reconstruction from the Iraqi invasion, economic diver-
sification and generating productive employment opportunities for a 
Kuwaiti population less dependent on foreign workers are the challenges 
of the 1990s. Development priorities for the remainder of the 1990s will 
include: reconstruction, mobilizing private sector resources, economic 
diversification and the creation of jobs for the growing number of young 
nationals coming into the labor market from universities. It is anticipated 
that rebuilding the economy will take between five to ten years. 1 
Employment creation is a critical factor. High population growth 
among Kuwait nationals has resulted in im age structure marked by 
extreme youthfulness. In 1985 almost 50 per cent of Kuwaiti citizens was 
under 15 years old, which implies that more Kuwait nationals will be 
entering the labor market in the 1990s. Moreover, these new arrivals on 
the labor market will have higher educational attainments and aspirations 
than their parents. Their expectations have been moulded by what has 
been an exceptional period of growth in the 70s and early 80s. 
Assuming the country will be able to resume oil production in the near 
term, Kuwait's financial future in the 1990s seems moderately secure. 
Next to reconstruction, the related issues of employment and 'Kuwaitiza-
tion' (the replacement of expatriate workers by Kuwaiti nationals) pose 
the biggest challenge to the government in the years ahead. Before the 
Iraqi invasion expatriates currently made up only a little less than two-
thirds of the population. The room for Kuwaitization in the upper levels 
of the administration and the public sector was already limited since most 
of these positions were filled. In addition, government revenues are not 
anticipated to increase rapidly enough to create a significant number of 
new employment opportunities. 
The dilemma faced by the government, therefore, is how to encourage 
the creation of private sector business which can simultaneously be 
economically viable and absorb the new educated generation. If this is 
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not done, Kuwait risks turning into a society with a mass of skilled 
underemployed citizens living off the state's wealth. 2 
It follows that the private sector will be called upon to build on the 
foundations largely created by public sector expenditures. Here the 
conventional wisdom is that the opportunities opened up for investment 
by public infrastructure and other development expenditures will create 
adequate opportunities for the absorption of the increased number of 
workers entering the labor force. Hopefully, many of the new jobs will be 
in the industrial sector as opposed to the tendency in the pre-invasion 
period for new entrants to be absorbed in the service sector (both public 
and private). 
Unfortunately, an increasingly large literature casts doubt on the 
ability of oil-financed government expenditures to provide a positive 
stimulus to the non-hydrocarbon sector and, in particular; industries that 
have to face foreign competition. This literature stresses disincentive 
effects associated with the resulting inflation and over-valuation (inflated 
purchasing power) of the domestic exchange rate.3 The so-called Dutch 
Disease problem brings to question whether the net government expendi-
tures have been particularly effective in providing for the country's 
longer-run indigenous employment needs. 
The general purpose of the. discussion below is to shed more light on the 
potential role of government expenditures in influencing industrial 
development in the post-invasion period. Based on Kuwait's experience 
before the invasion, the key questions are: did government expenditures 
stimulate increased levels of industrial output and employment; or, 
perhaps by diverting resources away from industrial activity, did these 
expenditures tend to depress the expansion of these sectors? 
IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON INDUSTRIAL 
DIVERSIFICATION 
With regard to the questions posed above, government expenditures, 
particularly direct investments in productive capacity, have obviously 
played a large and direct role in not only Kuwait's industrial expansion 
but also that of the other Gulf oil exporters. On the other hand, some of 
the side effects associated with this expenditure may have created an 
environment whereby the private sector will have difficulties competing 
on a profitable basis with foreign producers. 
Specifically, government expenditures in oil-based economies have the 
potential to set off a chain of price effects, whereby the profitability of 
internationally traded goods falls relative to non-traded goods - the so-
called 'Dutch Disease Effect'. The •'Dutch Disease' is a phenomenon 
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based on the experience of the Dutch economy with the large influx of 
North Sea gas revenues in the 1970s. Government spending of oil 
revenues causes prices of locally produced goods to increase relative to 
those traded internationally. These price changes induce labor and 
capital to shift from traded goods (industry and agriculture) to non-
traded goods (mainly services and construction). In such an environment, 
petroleum-finance public sector expenditures result in expanded im-
ports, and there is a decline in the relative price of traded goods. These 
patterns occur due to excess demand increasing the price of non-traded 
goods.4 
Since firms producing non-traded goods by definition do not have to 
face international competition, they have the potential to maintain or 
even increase their profitability by passing on cost increases in the form of 
higher domestic prices for their products. Firms producing traded goods, 
on the other hand, do not have this option because they have to meet 
foreign competition. Government assistance in the form of import 
restrictions could alleviate this situation. However, in the Gulf region 
governments have in large part committed themselves to a free market 
approach rather than direct government intervention. 
Whether or not the profitability of traded goods has fallen significantly 
in the Gulf states is, of course, ultimately an empirical matter. If this 
situation has developed, the potentially dynamic industries, such as 
manufacturing, will not be in a position to become the leading sectors 
many of the country's development plans envisage. Put differently, their 
expansion in employment and output in the 1990s will be suppressed 
below normal levels. 
Previous studies have found some evidence in the region of the 
presence of the Dutch Disease.4 The orientation of these studies was 
largely theoretical, however, with few (if any) policy ramifications con-
sidered. To overcome this limitation, the following sections examine the 
recent evolution of the Kuwaiti economy. Particular attention will be 
focused on identifying the existence of and policy implications associated 
with the Du,tch Disease. 
KUWAIT: PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC EXPANSION 
The industrial evolution of Kuwait occurred in three discernible stages.5 
The first was the establishment of a wide range of construction materials 
industries in response to the government's plan to use its vast oil revenues 
to expand and improve the country's infrastructure. 
The second was concentrated in consumer-oriented industries in 
response to the sharp increase in the demand for consumer goods, which 
. 
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resulted from the substantial influx of immigrant workers required to 
build the country's infrastructure. 
The third stage was represented by down-stream hydrocarbon in-
dustries, such as petroleum refining, fertilizers, petrochemicals and 
pharmaceuticals. The surge in these industries was effected by the 
government's attempt to harness the economy's comparative advantage 
in order to diversify the industrial sector, to reduce the country's depen-
dence on crude oil exports, and to broaden the income base of the 
country. 
The pre-invasion industrial sector in Kuwait could be segmented into 
four identifiable types of industrial activity:6 
1. Industries with abundant local materials. This group of industries 
obtained its cost advantage primarily from the availability of basic raw 
materials at home. Based on the abundance of natural gas and oil, where 
the latter can be used as a source of energy as well as feedstock, a host of 
refined petroleum products and petrochemicals can be produced at home 
for export. 
Some progress had already been achieved in the area of refined 
products and much can still be accomplished in intermediate and final 
petrochemicals. Similarly there are other industries whose major inputs 
are available at home, such .as foam glass from solid waste, reclaimed 
rubber from discarded tires, oil lubricants from discarded automobile oil, 
leather from animal waste, etc. These activities possess a clear-cut 
comparative cost advantage. 
2. Industries with natitral trade protection. The basic assumption here is 
that the shipping cost of certain products from other countries may be 
sufficiently high to render local production economically competitive, for 
example, cement, asbestos pipes, bricks and aggregates. This assumption 
readily explains the high pre-invasion ranking achieved by the construc-
tion materials industry in the Kuwaiti economy. Industries producing 
non-traded goods, such as desalinated water, also flourished and ex-
panded in response to population and commercial expansion. 
3. Strategic industries. These industries do not necessarily belong to the 
two categories mentioned above. Whether or not they exhibit compara-
tive advantage and/or are naturally protected from foreign competition, 
they were established to give the nation a measure of economic inde-
pendence despite reliance on government subsidies, that is, processed 
food products, soft drinks, milk, bread and pharmaceuticals. 
4. Industries with comparative cost advantage. Based on the optimal 
economic size and the sufficiency of the domestic demand, many in-
dustries may be competitive as a result of Kuwait's factor endowments 
vis-a-vis its trading partners. The basic premise here is that the structure 
• 
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of Kuwait's factor prices relative to other countries would, in certain 
industries according to the relative cost of each input to a unit of output, 
make it advantageous to produce the product at home instead of import-
ing it. Examples that existed in pre-invasion Kuwait included assembling 
central air conditioning units, printing, stationery, packaging materials, 
apparel, and automobile batteries. 
The industrial sector in pre-invasion Kuwait accounted for around nine 
per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Much of this output was 
concentrated in the state-owned refineries, petrochemical installations, 
and in power and desalination plants, although the light manufacturing 
sector makes a more significant contribution to employment. 
The rather small share that manufacturing industries contributed to 
Kuwait's non-oil GDP is usually attributable both to the small size of the 
country's population and to the fact that the government stood back from 
further local downstream industrialization of the oil and gas sector in 
recent years. 
The rather slow growth of Kuwaiti manufacturing before the invasion 
(Table 1) is often attributed to small domestic markets. However, Al-
Sabah's' analysis, while only covering the 1970s, points to the more 
fundamental Dutch Disease-related causes - the slow-down of manufac-
turing in the 1980s may simply be symptomatic of the residual effects of 
the pre-1982 oil boom. 
Along these lines, it should be noted that while there are notable 
exceptions, many manufacturing firms grew faster in the pre-1975 years 
than in later periods. The reverse appears to be the case for many of the 
service-oriented sectors. Again these patterns suggest that the simple 
Dutch Disease explanation of growth in Kuwait does have validity. The 
patterns of sectoral growth are so varied, however, that additional factors 
need to be incorporated before a complete assessment of the factors 
responsible for the observed patterns of growth over the last decade and a 
half can be made. 
The sectoral growth rates also indicate a considerable dichotomy 
between sectors, with those sectors consisting largely of non-traded 
goods growing faster (especially during the oil boom years of 1976-81) 
than sectors dominated by tradeable activities. These patterns appear to 
exist with regard to the underlying Dutch Disease mechanism of sectoral 
growth-differential rates of inflation between tradeables and non-trade-
ables. 
During the period of highest inflation in Kuwait (1974-82), manufac-
turing sectors in general experienced much lower rates of inflation than 
their service sector counterparts. Many of the manufacturing activities 
did not have rates of inflation appre~iably above their long-run average 
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TABLE 1 
KUWAIT: SECTORAL GROWTH, 1977-1986 
(Constant 1984 prices, million, K.D.) 
Growth 
1970/ 1970/ 1977/ 19821 
Sector 1986 1974 1986 1986 
Agriculture and Fishing 
Agriculture 12.4 10.6 27.8 27.3 
Fishing -4.6 3.4 -4.2 -7.3 
Mining and quarrying -1.3 33.49 -19.1 -13.1 
Manufacturing 
Food, beverages and tobacco 4.5 3.5 7.2 7.9 
Textiles, and apparel 3.9 31.2 3.0 -1.4 
Wood and wood products 5.1 9.2 -6.1 -6.2 
Paper, printing and publishing 8.1 12.7 0.6 -3.2 
Petroleum refining 1.5 -2.1 5.9 8.8 
Chemicals 6.3 43.3 -1.7 0.6 
Non-metallic minerals 7.2 17.7 -0.4 -5.0 
Basic metals 4.1 29.0 -15.2 -21.6 
Fabricated metal products 6.6 14.8 3.2 -7.8 
Other manufacturers 1.9 0.0 -5:2 0.0 
Construction 3.1 7.5 -4.9 -14.0 
Private Services 
Wholesale and retail trade 3.4 3.4 -0.7 -11.2 
Hotels and restaurants 7.2 0.6 1.2 -10.1 
Transport and storage 4.0 4.1 6.6 -8.7 
Communications 13.2 14.3 18.9 0.8 
Financial institutions 6.0 3.4 8.1 -0.1 
Insurance 4.9 2.3 2.8 -1.1 
Real estate 1.9 2.6 4.0 9.3 
Personal and household 1.5 6.7 -0.1 -5.2 
Public Services 
Public Administration and defense 2.5 10.2 3.1 3.4 
Sanitary 5.1 5.3 9.8 4.4 
Education 4.2 8.0 3.5 1.4 
Health 4.2 4.5 5.9 2.4 
Social Security and welfare 6.0 7.4 5.0 3.5 
Recreational and cultural 2.7 3.8 2.8 1.8 
Source: Computed from data in: State of Kuwait: Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical 
Office, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1987, pp.268-9 . 
• 
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TABLE 2 
KUWAIT: SECTORAL INFLATION, 1970-1986 





Sector 1974 1982 1982 1986 
Agriculture and Fishing 
Agriculture 0.631 1.180 8.14 5.66 
Fishing 0.329 1.222 17.82 12.65 
Mining and quarrying 0.593 0.952 6.10 5.24 
Manufacturing 
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.603 0.969 6.11 5.78 
Textiles, and apparel 0.628 0.996 5.93 6.16 
Wood and wood products 0.634 0.912 4.64 4.87 
Paper, printing and publishing 0.620 0.865 4.25 5.50 
Petroleum refining 0.934 0.629 -4.82 16.59 
Chemicals 0.517 0.890 7.02 6.01 
Non-metallic minerals 0.652 0.997 5.45 5.38 
Basic metals 0.804 0.973 2.41 5.06 
Fabricated metal products 0.648 1.066 6.41 4.09 
Other manufacturers 0.592 1.000 6.77 6.40 
Construction 0.554 0.943 6.87 5.91 
Private Services 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.581 0.961 6.4~ 5.71 
Hotels and restaurants 0.337 0.785 11.15 8.35 
Transport and storage 0.573 0.936 6.32 6.08 
Communications 0.980 1.000 0.26 0.41 
Financial Institutions 
Insurance 0.614 0.994 6.20 7.51 
Real estate 0.416 2.349 24.15 6.16 
Personal and household 0.324 0.863 13.02 8.80 
Public Services 
Public Administration and defense 0.323 1.012 15.34 9.87 
Sanitary 0.408 0.864 9.83 6.46 
Education 0.360 0.855 11.41 8.98 
Health 0.388 0.965 12.06 8.37 
Social Security and welfare 0.306 0.901 14.45 10.98 
Recreational and cultural 0.431 0.814 8.27 9.71 
Source: Computed from data in: State of Kuwait: Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical 
Office, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1987, pp.268-9 . 
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(1970-86) over this period. Again with several exceptions the service 
sectors tended to have appreciably higher inflation relative to their long-
run average during the 1970-82 period (Table 2). 
MECHANISMS OF ECONOMIC EXPANSION 
Clearly the output of the various sectors of the Kuwaiti economy were 
simultaneously affected by a number of factors in addition to those 
related to the appreciation of the real exchange rate. These factors need 
to be controlled in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the Dutch 
Disease impact. It is assumed here that output of each sector is a function 
of the .relative profitability of that sector, which in turn is a function of: 
1. The Dutch Disease proper as proxied by the real exchange rate. 
2. Sectoral output as between tradeables and non-tradeables, as proxied 
by the relative rate of sectoral inflation to that of the non-oil sectors of 
the economy as a whole. 
3. Resource shift factors, as proxied by the expected8 rate of inflation. 
4. Government subsidies as proxied by subsidized electricity. 
5. The general expansion in overall demand. 
This last variable is simply included as a control variable: there may be 
slow-downs in sectoral activity not related to the Dutch Disease per se, but 
rather to the general fall in sectoral demand brought on by a decline in oil 
revenues and/or government expenditures. Its expected sign is positive. 
In main findings of the analysis on sectoral growth9 (Table 3) of the 
regression exercises indicate: 10 
1. Primary activities - agriculture, fishing, and mining - exhibit mixed 
results with agriculture and mining experiencing weak Dutch Disease 
effects, with fishing obtaifling a positive stiniulus from this effect. As 
noted Kuwait is largely self-sufficient in fish and in this sense, given 
transport costs, the sector is effectively comprised of non-tradeables. 
2. Manufacturing activities exhibit a fairly consistent pattern. As an-
ticipated, this sector, comprised largely of products that are trade-
able, experienced generally negative impacts from an appreciating 
exchange rate, and an increase in relative prices. 
3. As expected, services consisting largely of non-tradeables generally 
·experienced positive Dutch Disease effects. 
OTHER EXPLANATIONS 
While the results of the analysis of movements in real exchange rates and 
relative prices indicated the pervasive presence of the Dutch Disease in 
Kuwait, it should be noted that output of most of the traded sectors has 
' 
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TABLE 3 
KUWAIT: FACTORS AFFECTING SECTORAL GROWTH 
Sector Dutch Relative Expected Economic 
Disease Inflation Inflation Expansion 
Agriculture 
Agriculture ins 
Fishing + ins ins 
Mining ins ins + 
Manufacturing 
Food ins ins + 
Textiles U' + + 
Wood Products ins ins + 
Paper products ins + + 
Petroleum Ref. ins ins ins 
Chemicals ins ins ins 
Non-Metallic Min. ins ins + 
Basic Metals ins ins ins 
Fabricated Met. ins + + 
Other Manufacturing ins + 
Construction + ins + + 
Private Services 
Trade ins + 
Hotels + + + 
Transport + ins 
Communications + + + ins 
Finance + ins + ins 
Insurance ins ins ins + 
Real Estate + ins ins ins 
Services + ins ins ins 
Public Services 
Public Administration ins ins + 
Sanitary + ins + + 
Education + + + 
Health + ins + + 
Social Security + ins ins 
Recreation ins + + ins 
Note: ( +) = positive impact on sectoral output and employment; (-) = negative impact on 
sectoral output and employment; (ins) = no or little impact on sectoral output and 
employment. Those sectors receiving a positive stimulus from subsidised electricity were: 
(a) agriculture, (b) food, (c) textiles, and (d) petroleum refining. 
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continued to decline even during the post-1982 period of real exchange 
depreciation. Does this mean that the Dutch Disease effects produced 
during the period of an appreciating exchange rate created irreversible 
disincentives to manufacturing and thus the ability. of this sector to create 
jobs? 
Here it should be noted that the slow-down in industry in Kuwait since 
1982 may have been due to once-and-for-all factors, albeit ones sufficient 
to offset the stimulating effect of the 'Reverse Dutch Disease'. In 
particular' a number of disappointments have been attributed to both bad 
management and depressed trading conditions in Kuwait that have 
followed the Soule al-Manakh crisis and the collapse of the Iraqi market. 
The slow growth of Kuwaiti industries prior to the invasion has also 
been attributed to the fact that: 11 
1. Mistakes were committed in the planning stages owing to incomplete 
economic, technical and marketing studies, and this resulted in huge 
industrial losses with the selling price of some commodities becoming 
40 per cent lower than forecast. 
2. Some studies even failed to determine the production capacity of 
projects. Some studies expected factories to reach maximum pro-
duction within a short period,:.-~d overlooked the link between 
production growth and labor on the one hand and market demand on 
the other. 
3. Some industrial projects did not get sufficient land for their activities 
or failed to obtain official permission. An important obstacle has been 
the almost complete lack of co-ordination among industrial projects, 
resulting in the establishment of several similar industries at the same 
time. This increased competition and created subsequent problems. 
4. Some industrial projects in the form of shareholding companies or 
individual projects faced financing problems. The owners could not 
obtain the required capital and depended on bank loans for which 
they paid high interest rates, thus reducing profitability. 
5. The Kuwaiti market has a high purchasing power but low sales 
because of the small population. This problem could have been 
overcome by exports to other Gulf markets, but lack of co-ordination 
has resulted in duplication of industries. The world economic situa-
tion in the early 1980s also harmed local industries, as the recession 
forced companies to reduce the price of their exports while at the 
same time facing increased volumes of imports at reduced prices. 
Of course, due to the invasion (except for the still relatively small size 
of the domestic market), these factors are to a large extent no longer 
present. However, the government will have to be aware of these 
• 
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potential problems and pursue policies that avoid a repeat of past 
mistakes. 
CONCLUSIONS 
As oil revenues resume in the near future, there are at least two 
approaches towards reconstruction. One strategy would be for the 
government to use its income to build up a viable and self-sufficient 
economy based on its own resources. An alternative approach would be 
to return to the country's underlying strategy since the mid-1970s of 
investing revenues abroad and living off that income. If the above results 
are an accurate picture of mechanisms at work in the Kuwaiti economy, 
the second school of thought appears correct. 
This leads to a rather pessimistic assessment of the future. Eventually 
large numbers of national workforce entrants, denied their first choice of 
public sector employment, will seek other opportunities for the private 
sector. Given an environment likely to possess Dutch Disease charac-
teristics, most of these jobs will have to be in the service sector, mainly 
finance. This reality is reinforced by the fact that rising budget deficits will 
limit the government's ability to create new public sector jobs for new 
graduates as they had in the past. The earlier policies had resulted in 
enormous over-staffing of government institutions. The new realities 
dominating the Kuwaiti labor market in the 1990s will lead nationals to 
seek those opportunities available in the market place, namely technical 
jobs and the more remunerative openings in the private sector. 
As the number of school and university graduates increases in the early 
1990s, while job preferences remain narrow, unemployment among the 
youth will become more visible or at least long job-search periods will 
surface. Such unemployment will result from the artificially high expecta-
tions of labor market entrants; the declining attraction of wage rates in 
the private sector; concern to limit the expansion of the public sector, 
combined with a mismatch between educational qualifications and skill 
requirements. 
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